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I. INTRODUCTION

T

errorists are front and center in today’s world. Global terrorists
incite outrage and fear. They lead to much hand-wringing and the
expenditure of countless sums. The concept of home-grown terrorists
has also entered the national security nomenclature, perhaps more
reviled because, locally born and bred, they are reasonably expected to
have fealty rather than enmity towards their country of origin. Then
there is a local terrorist of another sort: the intimate terrorist.1
Intimate terrorism, as defined by Michael Johnson in his book, A
Typology of Domestic Violence,2 is “violence deployed in the service
of general control” over a partner.3 With the threat of violence as a
cudgel, the intimate terrorist may be able to exercise non-violent
control over a partner by: (1) threats and intimidation; (2) monitoring;
(3) undermining the will to resist; and (4) undermining the ability to
resist.4
Intimate terrorists have long coercively controlled their partners
using both violent and non-violent methods. Modern technology now
makes this exercise of control much easier. How the ubiquity of
technology has enhanced the intimate terrorist’s powers can be
examined through the fictional character of Frances Flynn Benedetto.
Fran is the emergency room nurse, mother, and long-time battered
woman at the center of Anna Quindlen’s novel, Black and Blue.5 Set in
the late 1990s, the story relays how Fran escaped, with her son Robert,
from her husband Bobby. Bobby Benedetto was a police officer and
intimate terrorist. At one point during the years of violence before Fran
left, she came to the realization that she could not just leave; rather,
she would have to disappear.6 Finally, after one beating too many,
Fran contacted a woman whom she had heard speak at a session on
domestic violence for emergency room personnel at her hospital. That
woman, Patty Bancroft, helped victims escape. Within hours of the
contact, Patty provided Fran and her son Robert with new identities
and had them chauffeured to Philadelphia. In the Philadelphia train
station, a stranger dropped train tickets on the floor near where Fran
and her son stood; the tickets were for them. They boarded a train to
1

MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 6.
4
Id. at 26–29.
5
ANNA QUINDLEN, BLACK AND BLUE (1998).
6
Id. at 73.
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Florida, where another stranger picked them up and delivered them to
a shabby apartment to begin a new life.
Secrecy, Patty Bancroft had told the emergency room staff, is the
key to helping battered women successfully escape their tormentors.7
Unfortunately, in this high-tech age, secrecy can be hard to achieve8
and its relative, privacy, is an antiquated notion. Technology has
dramatically shifted what, how, and to whom information is disclosed.
Social intercourse is now conducted through the varied media that fit
loosely within the technology rubric. People communicate to the
multitudes through social media, e.g. Facebook and Twitter, as well as
receive communication in this manner from friends or celebrities.
On an individual basis, texting has supplanted the more oldfashioned mobile telephone call or even email. AAA TripTiks have
gone the way of the rotary telephone. GPS programs on phones and
computer tablets provide directions, of course, but also real-time
monitoring and geolocation.9 Small electronics with advanced
technological capacity are now practically appendages for many.
Benefits and pleasures accrue from technology, but detriments and
horrors also lurk therein. Nowhere are these negative uses of
technology more apparent than in the area of intimate terrorism.
Intimate terrorism is centuries old. Once authorized by law,10 it is now
outlawed. But it is a persistent crime, eluding laws to stop; technology
has made it easier.
Although the impact of technology on domestic violence has been
discussed for some years in varied literature,11 the ways in which the
7

Id. at 63.
See generally Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical
and Constitutional Barriers, 31 PACE L. REV. 228 (2011).
9
See Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your
Privacy, PC WORLD (Mar. 29, 2010, 10:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article
/192803/geolocation_101_how_it_works_the_apps_and_your_privacy.html
(geolocation is the “tech buzzword” to define the software available for smart phones
to both transmit data about the phone’s (and phone user’s) location and receive
location data).
10
See, e.g., Shelly M. Santry, Can You Find Me Now: Amanda’s Bill: A Case
Study in the Use of GPS in Tracking Pretrial Domestic Violence Offenders, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2011) (initially, English law gave a husband a right
to “chastise,” i.e., beat, his wife).
11
See, e.g., Laura Silverstein, Double Edged Sword, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 97
(2004-05); Cindy Southworth et al., High-Tech Twist on Abuse: Technology,
Intimate Partner Stalking, and Advocacy, 1 FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION &
HEALTH PRAC. 3–5 ( 2005), available at http: //www.mincava.umn.edu/documents
/commissioned/stalkingandtech/stalkingandtech.pdf.
8
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law deals with technology are emerging more slowly. Several
problems emerge in assessing the value of the legal changes. First, the
changes to combat technologically enhanced intimate terrorism are
spread throughout the civil and criminal legal systems and, thus, are
hard to track. Moreover, the comparisons between legal efforts in one
state as opposed to another may be inconclusive or, worse, inaccurate
because the laws are not necessarily parallel. Also, the changes have
been piecemeal and their efficacy is largely untested. Finally, the
diffuse nature of technology allows for imprecise generalizations and
impedes concrete categorization.12
This article begins with a brief intimate terrorism primer. It then
proceeds to examine some of the specific ways in which technological
issues affect domestic violence. This discussion will include how
technology—broadly defined—has been useful in combating intimate
terrorism. It will also explore ways in which technology has increased
the capacity of the intimate terrorist. Next, the article will consider
some recent legislative efforts to confront the problem of domestic
violence and technology. Finally, after examining the current legal
landscape, the article will discuss some issues that still need attention.
II. INTIMATE TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In A Typology of Domestic Violence,13 Michael P. Johnson laments
domestic violence generalizations and sets out to identify subsets
within the larger rubric. After analyzing the available research and
literature, he argues that there are four distinct types of domestic
violence: intimate terrorism, violent resistance, situational couples
violence, and mutual violent control.14 Of these types, intimate
terrorism most closely resembles the prototypical pattern of domestic
violence, which is now understood as, at its core, being about coercive
control of the victim/survivor.15 The other types of domestic violence
identified by Johnson do not involve “coercive control.”16 They may
12

See discussion infra Part III.A.
JOHNSON, supra note 1.
14
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 7–12.
15
It has become common to refer to survivors rather than victims. However,
some don’t survive. Nonetheless, the terms victim and survivor will be used
interchangeably in this article.
16
See Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 986 (1995) (Dr. Evan Stark
uses the term coercive control to indicate the type of generally non-violent behavior
that a batterer exercises over his victim, noting that this “ongoing strategy of
13
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involve self-defense or a generally aggressive disposition,17 but the
batterer is not trying to control the victim through coercion, violent or
otherwise.18
Over the past two generations, domestic violence has received an
enormous amount of attention. It has come out into the open; no longer
may it hide under the cloak of family privacy. After centuries of no
laws dealing with domestic violence,19 each state now has a statute
authorizing protection orders for domestic violence victims.20 These
statutes are routinely amended to expand the category of persons
protected, the actions prohibited, or the remedies available.
The expansion of the category of persons who are now protected
under protection order statutes or under criminal domestic assault
statutes is largely laudable. It demonstrates an understanding of the
changed nature of intimate partners in American society. That status is
intimidation, isolation, and control . . . extends to all areas of a woman’s life. . ..”
(emphasis in original). Stark argues that the batterer’s occasional violence makes this
strategy of coercive control effective.).
17
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 60–71.
18
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 17.
19
See Santry, supra note 10.
20
ALA. CODE § 30-5-3 (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2011); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN § 13-3602 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-207 (West 2011); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6218 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-15 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-1005
(2011); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (West 2011);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6304 (West 2011);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-2 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4 (West 2011);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (West
2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007
(2011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-2950 (West 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (West
2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-202
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (West
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26 (West
2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (West 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842
(McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-2 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-31.2-02 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26 (West 2011);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (West
2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-153 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-3
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-603 (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001
(West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-108 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1103 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.10 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.99.050 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-501 (West 2011); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (West 2011).
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no longer limited to heterosexual married couples. On the other hand,
the expansion is overbroad and leads to peculiar results.21 Coverage of
household members could and should include intimate partners who
live together but also may include, for instance, law school
roommates. Thus, the remedies in these statutes, which are designed
primarily to protect those who are being coercively controlled, are illsuited as a response to an altercation between non-intimate roommates.
In addition to enlarging the categories of protected persons, states
are paying more attention to the insidious linkage between intimate
terrorism and other areas. For instance, after decades of denying the
interrelationship between child rearing and intimate terrorism, most
states now permit or mandate that judges consider past or extant
domestic violence when determining child custody.22 After years of
blindness towards the co-existence between child abuse and intimate
terrorism, many child protection agencies now have domestic violence
experts housed within the agency.23 This represents the sensible
realization that helping a mother who is a victim of intimate terrorism
has benefits that redound to the child.24
Prosecutors, law enforcement, and criminal courts have also
altered their approaches. The mandatory arrest and mandatory
prosecution waves of the 1990s changed the ways that police interact
at the scene and how prosecutors treat these cases in court. New
crimes have been legislated, such as criminalizing the violation of a
protection order.25 Batterers’ treatment programs, although
controversial, are increasingly common.26 Statutes authorizing the
global positioning system (GPS) monitoring of offenders are among
the current legal changes underway.27
The majority of laws concerning domestic violence are found at
the state level. However, federal laws now aid in combating the
societal scourge of intimate terrorism. Most prominent is the Violence

21

See infra Part V.C.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (West 2011).
23
See Ali Stieglitz et al., Making Child Support Safe, Coordinating Child
Support and Public Assistance Agencies in Their Response to Domestic Violence,
U.S. DEP’T. OF HHS: ACF OCSE REP. (May 2001), available at http: //www.acf.hhs
.gov/programs/cse/pubs/reports/mpr8548300/.
24
Justine Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of
Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004).
25
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011).
26
Id. § 10.
27
See discussion infra Part IV.
22
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Against Women Act.28 Other federal enactments include laws against
stalking, itself a relatively new crime that is carried out
disproportionately by intimate or formerly intimate partners.29
The obvious progress notwithstanding, much work remains. Critics
justly lament the legal system’s inability to effectively deal with the
problem despite the increased attention and resources that have been
provided.30 Further, some of the advancements have supplied a new
crop of problems. For instance, increased public awareness and new
laws have led to the perception, and the occasional reality, that the
system is being gamed to gain advantage in custody and divorce
proceedings or, more perniciously, is simply anti-male. On the other
hand, there is a view among victims, batterers, and on-lookers alike
that a protection order is a piece of paper that offers little protection.31
In Black and Blue, Fran talked about how batterers and victims both
viewed a protection order as “a joke, made, as they say, to be
broken.”32
Intimate terrorism is thus a dance that consists of one step forward
and two steps backward or two steps forward and one step backward.
Whatever the precise choreography at a given moment, much is left to
do. Into this current state of affairs, technology has been thrust and is a
reality that demands a reckoning.33
III. INTIMATE TERRORISM AND TECHNOLOGY
Technology is a two-way street. It can give an intimate terrorist
enhanced capacity to threaten, intimidate, and monitor his victim; it
can also be used to benefit a survivor. GPS technology can track
intimate terrorists to an effort to ensure they stay away from court-

28

Violence Against Women and Dep’t of Just. Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of
2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13701 (West 2010).
29
The Model Stalking Code Revisited, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
13 (Jan. 2007), available at http: //www.ncvc.orgv/src/AGP.Net/Components
/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=45930.
30
LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE (2012).
31
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (doing little to
dispel the notion the protection orders are ineffectual when it declared that the holder
of a protection order did not have an entitlement to have that order enforced by the
police).
32
QUINDLEN, supra note 5, at 64.
33
See Jill P. Dimond et al., Domestic Violence and Information Communication
Technologies, 23(5) INTERACTING WITH COMPUTERS 413 (2011) (discussing the pros
and cons of technology as reported by victims).
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ordered exclusion zones.34 Technology leaves a trail in its wake; that
trail may be admissible in court against an intimate terrorist.35
Further, to successfully escape, a survivor must create a plan that
helps her get or keep away from the perpetrator.36 On-line resources
can be invaluable to a survivor in her efforts to escape. However, online research can be perilous for a survivor. An intimate terrorist can,
through the use of spyware or keystroke technology, ascertain the
details of a survivor’s computer usage.37 These details may reveal the
resources a survivor has used to get help or how she is planning to
escape.38 A perpetrator’s increased access, by virtue of technology, to
a survivor’s plans for escape—either from a shared household or from
the relationship—places the survivor at increased risk of harm due to
the phenomenon known as separation assault. 39
Separation assault means that the survivor is at greater risk when
she is seeking to leave the batterer. When one accepts that intimate
terrorism is about the perpetrator’s coercive control of his partner—or
ex-partner—separation assault is sadly predictable. The perpetrator
realizes that his efforts at control are failing when he learns of his
victim’s plans to leave. He then redoubles his attempts to control,
often leading to assault at the time of separation.
In Black and Blue, where the violence continued for years, one
might long to ask Fran, “Why did you stay?”And if asked, Fran might
explain with the taunt once delivered by her police officer husband,
“What the hell [are you] going to tell the cops?”40 However an
34

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See State v. Sukin, No. 24585-3-III, 2007 WL 2254425, at *2 (Wash. App.
Div. 3 Aug. 7, 2007); Commonwealth v. Thissell, 910 N.E.2d 943 (Mass. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Cushna, No. 08–P–5, 2009 WL 763743, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Mar. 25, 2009); Ruise v. State, 43 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 2010).
36
See NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http: //www.nnedv.org
/resources/stats/gethelp.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); NAT’L COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http:// www.ncadv.org/protectyourself/MyPersonalSafetyPlan
.php. (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
37
See infra Part III.B.2.
38
See Dimond, supra note 33 (many advocacy websites now instruct victims on
how to lessen, if not eliminate their non-paper trail. For instance the Nat’l Network
to End Domestic Violence has the following message on its website’s homepage:
“SAFETY ALERT: If you are in danger, please use a safer computer, or call 911, a
local hotline, or the U.S. Nat’l Domestic Violence Hotline at 1-800-799-7233 and
TTY 1-800-787-3224. Learn more technology safety tips. There is always a
computer trail, but you can leave this site quickly.”).
39
Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65
(1991).
40
QUINDLEN, supra note 5.
35
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individual survivor might respond to the “why did you stay?” query, it
is now axiomatically regarded as the wrong question: a question that
blames the survivor for the violence she endures.41
But Fran did ultimately leave—or disappear as she would have
said.42 After the abuse increased in severity and she realized the impact
of it on her son, she reached out to people who could help her escape.
At the nucleus of her exit strategy was her ability to remain hidden
from Bobby, her husband as well as her intimate terrorist.
Here’s where the insidiousness of technology comes into play. If
Bobby had access to technology, he could have coercively controlled
Fran, in part through monitoring her activities.43 He could have found
out what friends or professionals she was contacting to assist in her
escape by accessing her computer through spyware or through her
improvident posts on social networking sites.44 In that way, he may
have been able to prevent her from escaping in the first place.
As it was, Bobby had to wait until his son surreptitiously called
him, at which point he used his police contacts to unscramble the
telephone number.45 Today, however, Bobby could have found Fran
by virtue of GPS technology on his son’s phone. He would not have
needed his police contacts.
A. Taxonomy of Technology: Definitions and Uses
Technology is difficult to define. While certain understandings are
summoned up by the use of various terms, a precise shared meaning is
often lacking. Although common understandings may be elusive, two
diverse examples of recent technologies that are used in intimate
terrorism are defined as follows: (1) social media: “forms of electronic
41

The question has staying power because it is difficult for those not enmeshed
in a domestic violence situation to truly understand the power that an intimate
terrorist has against his victim. Two of the four factors that Johnson uses to define
the intimate terrorist are undermining the will to resist and undermining the ability to
resist. An understanding of these two factors explains why she didn’t leave. Getting
to a place where the question itself is rarely asked is a larger, perhaps impossible,
task. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 269.
42
QUINDLEN, supra note 5; see also Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence:
Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Order,
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303 (2011) (Survivors who leave often return. This is true for a
myriad of reasons.).
43
Even before current technologies expanded, monitoring was one of the four
non-violent tactics used by intimate terrorists. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27.
44
See, e.g., Katherine F. Clevenger, Spousal Abuse Through Spyware, 21 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. L. 653 (2008).
45
QUINDLEN, supra note 5, at 273.
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communication (as Web sites for social networking and
microblogging) through which users create online communities to
share information, ideas, personal message, and other content”; (2)
global positioning system: “a navigational system using satellite
signals to fix the location of a radio receiver on or above the earth’s
surface: also the radio receiver so used.”46
Although these terms are capable of definition, they are inherently
inexact. The vast fluidity in the definitions has created problems
crafting legal responses such as appropriate legislation, where the clear
definition of terms is critical to proper application of the law to cover
its intended purpose.47 Also, technology can transform common items,
such as a telephone, with new uses that stretch the law. In one case, an
appellate court refused to sustain a conviction for harassing telephone
calls because, although a telephone was used, the messages came via
text. Texting was beyond the meaning of the statute.48 Thus, harassing
telephone calls were illegal, but the same texted content via the same
device (a telephone) was not.
B. How Technology is Used in Intimate Terrorism
1. Social Media
Social media is a now-ubiquitous technology that connects people
virtually.49 Social media sites include Facebook, Twitter, and
Tumblr.50 These media sites are touted for their utility in making and
maintaining connections. One general consequence of technology is its
lessening of a personal sense of privacy boundaries.51 This effect is
vividly displayed in the use of social media. What people post on their
Facebook walls makes many cringe including, though perhaps at a

46

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 542 (11th ed. (2003).
See infra Part IV.
48
Commonwealth v. Lane, No. 09-P-2134, 2011 WL 383024, at *1 (Mass. App.
Ct. Feb. 8, 2011).
49
See Andrew R. Sorkin, Those Millions on Facebook? Some May Not Actually
Visit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012 9:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/06
/those-millions-on-facebook-some-may-not-actually-visit/ (the exact number of users
may be unknown; even the definition of users is in dispute).
50
23 Types of Social Media, ONBLOGGINGWELL.COM (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:23 PM),
http://onbloggingwell.com/23-types-of-social-media-sites/.
51
Andrew King-Ries, Teens, Technology, and Cyberstalking: The Domestic
Violence Wave of the Future?, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131 (2011).
47
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later date, the individuals who made the postings. Worse yet,
impulsive postings can be used later as indicia of wrongdoing.52
In addition to blurring the boundaries of privacy, social media can
also be used for nefarious purposes. Intimate terrorists can use
Facebook, for example, to spread harmful, untrue information about
survivors in a venue where many people—often friends (or friends of
friends) or relatives who are known to both parties—will be able to see
it.53 This use can affect the survivor’s will or ability to leave.
Intimate terrorists can also use the information that survivors
unwisely post to gain knowledge of their activities.54 This knowledge
can, in turn, help the intimate terrorist to more effectively terrorize his
victim or thwart her escape. If Facebook had existed at the time of
Black and Blue, Fran or young Robert could have unwittingly posted
information on it that would have provided Bobby with leads about
their location.
2. Software and Hardware
There are several types of technology that are increasingly misused
by the intimate terrorist. These include spyware and keystroke
technology.55 Spyware, a specific type of malware,56 is defined as
software “that is installed in a computer without the user’s knowledge
and transmits information about the user’s computer activities over the
Internet.”57 Spyware can be installed remotely or through physical

52

See William Glaberson, N.Y.C. Police Maligned Paradegoers on Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/ny region/onfacebook-nypd (police officer’s posting referring to West Indians as “savages” and
terming Internal Affairs officers “rats”).
53
Id.
54
See Law Enforcement Guidelines, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com
/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
55
See, e.g., Melissa F. Brown, Safety and Security in a Digital Age, S.C. LAW.
(July 2010), available at http: //www.scbar.org/MemberResources/Publications
/SouthCarolinaLawyer.aspx (There are also pre-paid phone cards, whose technology
may be available through smart phone applications. SPOOFCARDS or LIARCARDS
permit callers to disguise their identity—including changing voice gender—when
making calls. TRAPCALL, on the other hand, reveals caller identity and phone
number even when the caller has a blocked or unlisted number.).
56
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malware
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
57
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spyware
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
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access to a computer.58 It is not necessarily a virus and therefore may
not be detected and removed through anti-virus software. Spyware
continuously monitors a person’s computer usage by recording the
contents of a computer screen every few seconds.59
Keystroke technology is hardware, which, installed directly on a
computer, records all keystrokes.60 This information is stored on a
miniscule hard drive and allows access to typically confidential items
such as passwords and personal identification numbers. It is also
reported that this technology is installed on certain smart phones.61
Spyware and keystroke technology have legitimate purposes. They
can be used, for example, to appropriately monitor a child’s computer
usage. But, these technologies are easily used by intimate terrorists to
monitor their victims. Imagine if Bobby could access all websites that
Fran visited, all the emails or texts that she sent, all telephone calls that
she made, as well as any activity on their on-line bank account. In this
highly digitized age, it would be nearly impossible for Fran to escape
Bobby without using computers, telephones, or internet resources.
3. Global Positioning Systems
A GPS is a navigational system that uses satellite signals to fix the
location of a radio receiver.62 Unstated but implicit is this: if the radio
receiver is affixed to something, the location of that something is
known or knowable. The radio receiver can be attached to or designed
into a car.63 It can be part of a smart phone or tablet computer that
accompanies a person throughout the day.64
GPS technology can be used easily by intimate terrorists. Survivors
who are trying to escape their abusers or think they have already done
so can be tracked constantly. As one private investigator put it, the
technology “to the victim is just as terrorizing as seeing [a face] in the
58

Southworth, supra note 11, at 7; see also, Cindy Southworth & Sarah Tucker,
Technology, Stalking and Domestic Violence Victims, 76 MISS. L.J. 667 (2007)
(providing overview of all types of technology).
59
Clevenger, supra note 44.
60
Southworth, supra note 11, at 7 (keystroke technology can also be software).
61
Katherine Rushton, Software on Android Phones ‘Tracking Every Keystroke’,
THE TELEGRAM (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/mobilephones/8927164/Software-on-Android-phones-tracking-every-key-stroke.html.
62
See supra Part III.A.
63
See ONSTAR, http://www.onstar.com (Apr. 4, 2012).
64
CES: GPS Soon to [sic] Integrated with Field Computers and Smartphones,
TMCNET.COM (Sept. 27, 2010), http://m2m.tmcnet.com/topics/m2mevolution
/articles/104560-ces-gps-soon-integrated-with-field-computers-smartphones.htm.
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window at night before they [sic] go to bed.”65 Threats and
intimidation, monitoring, undermining the will of the victim to resist,
and undermining the ability of the victim to resist: these are the tactics
of the intimate terrorist.66 Each of these tactics is made easier, scarier,
and deadlier by the technologies described above.67
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON
INTIMATE TERRORISM
A. Anti-Stalking Statutes
Stalking and intimate terrorism can go hand-in-hand. Stalking
behavior goes to the heart of the intimate terrorist’s monitoring
strategy as described by Johnson.68 Technology can make the stalker
appear omnipresent and omniscient to the victim. GPS technology,
whether on cars or telephones, allows an intimate terrorist to know the
whereabouts of his victim at all times.69 Her attempts to evade him are
ineffectual as technology makes her easy to find. In one case, for
instance, a husband put a GPS tracking device on his wife’s car and
installed spyware on her cell phone. The wife left after a domestic
violence incident, but her husband sent her text messages
demonstrating that he knew her whereabouts and was monitoring
her.70
Stalking is a relatively new crime.71 It gained notoriety early on in
several high profile cases where the stalker was obsessed with the
victim, but did not know her personally.72 In reality, however, stalking
is not usually a crime between strangers. Stalkers know their victims;

65

Erik Eckholm, Private Snoops Find GPS Trail Legal to Follow, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/gps-devices-are-being-usedto-track-cars-and-errant-spouses.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
66
See supra Part I.
67
See M.M. v. J.B., No. CN08-05322, 2010 WL 1200329, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Jan. 12, 2010) (person subject to a protection order put a GPS tracker on the victim’s
car shortly after the protection order was entered).
68
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 102–3.
69
See Minnesota v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
70
Id.
71
The first stalking statute was in Cal. in 1990. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West
2011).
72
Ashley Beagle, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State Anti-Stalking
Statutes Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 CHAP. L.
REV. 457, 467-69 (2011).
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77% of female stalking victims are stalked by someone they know and
59% are stalked by current or former intimate partners.73
All states now have anti-stalking statutes.74 Congress passed an
anti-stalking statute in 1996.75 Unfortunately, technology has made
some of these statutes virtually obsolete and, in some circumstances,
counterproductive. Original anti-stalking statutes often required the
stalker to be visually or physically proximate to the victim. Now,
however, the victim can be found and stalked remotely. The stalker
can access her computer or smart phone. Even for the non-tech savvy
person, technological stalking is surprisingly easy. On-line step-bystep instructions chillingly show the way.76
The impact of technology on the crime of stalking was addressed
in the 2007 revision of the Model Stalking Code.77 Congress and some
individual states have modified their stalking laws. For instance, New
Jersey amended its stalking statute, effective in 2009, to define
stalking as a “course of conduct” . . . by “any action, method, device,
or means . . . surveilling . . . a person.”78 The legislative history, taken
from the revised Model Stalking Code, provides that the new language
is meant to cover stalking through technology such as GPS tracking of
a victim’s car.79 Likewise, Alaska amended its stalking statute last
year. It now includes following or monitoring a victim by GPS or by
installing a device—including software—on a victim’s computer,
telephone, vehicle, or at her work place or residence.80
Recently, the high-tech crime of cyberstalking has garnered
attention.81 Anti-cyberstalking laws generally preclude acts that occur
73

The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 30, at 13.
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-5-38 (2) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-07.1-19 (2009); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 335.1A (2)(a) (2011).
75
12 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West 2012).
76
John Loveall, Stalking by a “High Tech” Guy: A View from the Other Side
NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2005), available at http://www.ncvc.org/src
/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=41389.
77
The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 29.
78
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West 2011) (emphasis added); see also ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (2011) (Maine similarly defines “course of
conduct” in its stalking statute).
79
An Act concerning stalking and amending P.L. 1994, c. 119, Assembly, No.
1563—L.2009, ch. 28 (N.J. 2008) (the new law also enhances the severity of the
crime of stalking, including in circumstances where it occurs in contravention of a
protection order).
80
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.135 (a) (West 2011).
81
See generally Naomi Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Law, 72 MO. L. REV. 125 (2007).
74
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via the internet, with computers, or networking. An anti-cyberstalking
statute, therefore, would not bar stalking by GPS or spyware.82 The
drafters of the Model Stalking Statute, Revisited, have expressed
concern about potential confusion between stalking and cyberstalking
statutes. The revised model stalking law covers technological advances
but is in fact broader in coverage than are most cyberstalking
statutes.83
B. GPS Monitoring of Offenders
GPS monitoring may be ordered for persons charged with crimes
involving domestic violence.84 Some states have added GPS tracking
language to statutes specifically dealing with domestic violence
offenders.85 In other states, such statutes are pending.86 These statutes
are found scattershot throughout state codes. They are located in
criminal codes, family law codes, and independent civil protection
order statutes.87
Although a state may not have a law specifically authorizing the
use of GPS technology in domestic violence cases, that monitoring
still may be available. Many domestic violence crimes are prosecuted
under traditional criminal statutes, such as assault, battery, stalking,
rape, and murder. Therefore, if a jurisdiction has authority to order
GPS monitoring of standard offenses, domestic violence cases should
be included within that mandate.
Domestic violence/GPS (hereinafter “DV/GPS”) statutes may be
categorized by whether they sanction monitoring in the pre-trial or
post-conviction phase. Some statutes permit GPS monitoring as part of
conditional release for persons accused of violating a protection
order.88 Other statutes apply only after a person has been found guilty
of a crime involving domestic violence—perhaps the violation of a
protection order, perhaps another crime—and receives probation rather
than jail or prison time.89
82

Id.
The Model Stalking Statute Revisited, supra note 29, at 64.
84
The DV/GPS statutes generally use the term domestic violence, so that term,
rather than intimate terrorism, will be used through this section.
85
Ariana Green, More States Use GPS to Track Abusers, N.Y. TIMES (May 8,
2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/05/09/us/09gps.html.
86
See, e.g., WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, available at http://www.womenslaw
project.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
87
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011).
88
E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2011).
89
See infra Part IV.B.2.
83
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1. Pre-Trial Monitoring
Some statutes permit GPS monitoring in a pre-trial circumstance.
Often, the crime alleged is violation of a civil protection order.90
Accordingly, the defendant, although in a pre-trial status, has already
been ordered, at a minimum, not to abuse the victim, and is alleged to
have violated that order. Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
North Dakota are among the states that have statutes permitting pretrial monitoring.91 The Arkansas and Texas statutes discussed below
are fairly representative of this class of statute.
Under Arkansas’s Family Law Code, a defendant charged with
violating either an ex parte or final order of protection may be released
provided he is placed under electronic surveillance.92 The statute
specifically defines the type of electronic monitoring, which may lead
to problems as technology changes.93 Surveillance is defined as
“active”94 technology that is a “single-piece device that immediately
notifies law enforcement . . . of a violation of the distance
requirements.”95 The technology can be tracked by “satellite or cellular
phone tower triangulation.”96
In Texas, a person charged with an offense of family violence97
may be ordered to “carry or wear” a GPS device “as a condition of
release on bond.”98 Prior to entering such an order, the judicial officer
is compelled to consider the likely deterrent effect of such
90

In many states, the violation of a protection order is a separate crime.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004
(West 2011); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 335.1A (2)(a) (2011); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-5-38 (2) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-19 (2009).
92
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217 (West 2011).
93
See id. § 9-15-217(C) (the surveillance is to be at the defendant’s expense).
94
GPS technology is either active or passive. Active technology reports location
information nearly instantaneously. Passive technology uploads the data several
times a day—not often enough to protect a victim. Robert S. Gable, Left to Their
Own Devices: Should Manufacturers of Offender Monitoring Equipment be Liable
for Design Defect?, 2009(2) U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 333, 337 (2009).
95
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217(C).
96
See id. § 9-15-217(C).
97
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (West 2011) (family violence is defined as an
act by a household or family member that is intended to result in physical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the
member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault,
but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself).
98
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.49(b)(2) (West 2011) (like Ark., a
defendant must pay the cost of monitoring but, if he is indigent, he may be ordered to
pay less than the full cost of the GPS monitoring).
91
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monitoring.99 Further, the judicial officer must seek input from a
victim as to the areas from which the defendant is to be excluded. The
judicial officer also must provide the victim with information
regarding: 1) her right to participate or refuse to participate; 2) the
functioning and limitations of the technology and “the extent to which
the system will track and record the victim’s location and movements;
3) the locations from which the defendant is barred; 4) sanctions
available in the event of a violation; 5) the procedures to follow if the
GPS monitoring fails; and 6) the lack of confidentiality for the
victim’s communications with the court.100
2. Post-Conviction Monitoring
Other states permit DV/GPS monitoring only after a defendant has
been found to have violated an order of protection.101 Massachusetts
was one of the first states to enact DV/GPS legislation. In 2007, it
amended its Abuse Prevention statute (209A) to provide that a court
may, in lieu of incarceration and as a condition of probation, order that
a defendant “wear a global positioning satellite tracking device
designed to transmit and record the defendant’s location data.”102 If a
defendant enters an “exclusion zone,” that information is transmitted
“immediately” to the victim and the police.103 A court finding that the
defendant entered the exclusion zone will result in the revocation of
probation. Although this statute is more than four years old, as of
January 2012, just 96 DV offenders were wearing GPS monitors and
being tracked by the Massachusetts Department of Probation.104
In Kentucky, GPS monitoring is also an option only after a
defendant has been found to have engaged in a “substantial violation”
of a protection order.105 The court, before imposing monitoring, must
give the victim certain information, similar to that mandated in
Texas.106 The Kentucky statute also specifically gives the offender the
right to provide information as to why monitoring ought not be

99

Id. at 17.49(b)(2).
Id.
101
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (i)(1) (West 2011).
102
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2011).
103
Id.
104
E-mail from Steven Bocko, Mass. Dep’t of Probation, to author (Jan. 24,
2012, 03:11 PM) (on file with U. MASS. L. REV.).
105
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761 (West 2011).
106
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.49(b)(2) (West 2011).
100
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imposed.107 Before ordering monitoring, the court must consider the
likelihood that the offender will “seek to kill, assault, stalk, harass,
menace, or otherwise threaten” the victim without the imposition of
GPS monitoring.108 The court is also required to make findings of fact
regarding the granting or denying of a monitoring request.109
3. Pre-Trial and Post-Conviction Monitoring
Several states allow for GPS monitoring after either a charge and
or a conviction. In Oklahoma, for instance, a defendant who is alleged
to have either violated a protection order or committed other offenses
of domestic violence, including stalking, may be required to use a GPS
monitoring device.110 Before entering such an order, the court must
find that the defendant has a “history that demonstrates an intent to
commit violence against the victim . . . ”111 In addition, the court may
permit the victim to monitor the defendant’s location; however, the
statute specifically limits monitoring by the victim to areas that
implicate her safety.112 Oklahoma also permits the use of GPS
monitoring of a defendant who has been convicted of violating a
protective order.113 Illinois similarly permits both pre-trial and postconviction monitoring.114
4. Constitutional Issues
The use of GPS technology in law enforcement has been
challenged on a variety of grounds.115 In U.S. v. Jones, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the police may not install a GPS device on a
suspect’s car without a valid search warrant.116 The case raised legal
issues largely different from those found in DV/GPS statutes; its
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KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761(5) (West 2011).
Id. § 403.761(7)(a).
109
Id. § 403.761(7)(b).
110
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.17 (West 2011).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.6 (West 2011).
114
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8A-7 (West 2011) (Enacted in 2009, this
statute was introduced following the killing of Cindy Bischof, by her ex-boyfriend.).
115
See, e.g., People v. Randolf, 84 Cal. Rptr. 559 (2006); United States v.
Sparks, 750 F.Supp.2d 384 (D. Mass. 2010); Com v. Raposo, 905 N.E.2d. 545
(2009); Com v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d. 187 (2009). See also Zoila Hinson, GPS
Monitoring and Constitutional Rights, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (2008).
116
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
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impact, therefore, is indirect.117 The opinion does provide a window,
however, into the Court’s thinking on the Fourth Amendment
considerations of GPS monitoring.118
Although unanimous in outcome, the Court split 5-4 in its
rationale. The five person majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia,
found that the placement and use of the device on Jones’s car was a
search.119 Scalia’s majority opinion focused on the physical intrusion
involved in planting the device, which was the basis for search and
seizure law until the 1960s.120 However, more recent Fourth
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence has focused on
reasonable expectations of privacy, not on physical intrusions.121
Therefore, the impact of a return to a property-based inquiry remains
to be seen. Certainly, it is a curious twist for a technology case, as
117

Santry, supra note 10, at 1110–14 (for instance, DV offenders are monitored
so that they do not enter into exclusions zones—such places that the victim
inhabits—that have already been legally declared off-limits in a protection order.
Offenders, therefore, would be unable to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in
these areas).
118
Although Jones involved drugs, GPS tracking by police could be used in
cases involving domestic violence. In Wisconsin v. Sveum, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld the police use of GPS to track an alleged stalker, notwithstanding
assertions of Fourth Amendment violations. Wisconsin v. Sveum, 787 N.W.2d 317,
330-33 (2010). In that case, however, unlike Jones, a valid warrant was issued to
authorize the installation of the GPS device. Id.
119
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (The car belong to Jones’s wife but the Court
found that he had “at least the property rights of a bailee.”).
120
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-353 (1967); see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739, 740 (1979) (“In Katz, Government agents had
intercepted the contents of a telephone conversation by attaching an electronic
listening device to the outside of a public phone booth. The Court rejected the
argument that a ‘search’ can occur only when there has been a ‘physical intrusion’
into a ‘constitutionally protected area,’ noting that the Fourth Amendment ‘protects
people, not places.’ Because the Government’s monitoring of Katz’ conversation
‘violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth,’ the Court held that it ‘constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
121
Smith, 442 U.S. at 739 (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has
held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
invoking its protection can claim a “justifiable,” a “reasonable,” or a “legitimate
expectation of privacy” that has been invaded by government action. E.g., Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36, (1973); Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)”). See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
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technological techniques are increasingly available without any need
for a physical trespass.
Justice Alito, in an opinion concurring in the judgment only, took
issue with the majority’s reliance on a trespass-based analysis.122
Alito’s opinion retained the focus of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test articulated in U.S. v. Katz.123 Relevant to the issues here,
Alito’s concurrence considers the often non-physical element of new
technology, much of which can be installed from afar.124
The result in Jones is clear, despite the differing rationales. Police
must obtain a warrant before they can physically place a GPS tracking
device on a suspect’s automobile. Less clear, in part because of the
differing rationales, is the decision’s effect on the current crop of
DV/GPS tracking laws.125
V. A VIEW TO THE FUTURE
Technology’s impact on intimate terrorism—for good and for ill—
is inescapable. On the one hand, intimate terrorists will continue to
exploit new methods that expand their ability to coercively control
their quarry. However, victims may be able to combat technological
assaults as well as use technology to gain safety. The impact of
technology will be ever-changing as technological methods advance.
The following issues will require on-going attention as both law and
technology evolve, doubtless at an uneven pace.
A. GPS Monitoring
Monitoring of intimate terrorists via GPS technology creates both
legal and non-legal challenges. They include the constitutionality of
monitoring, its efficacy, its technological capability, and its proper
implementation.
1. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of the monitoring of intimate terrorists will
vary, depending on the language of a particular statute and to whom

122

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-59 (Alito, J., concurring) (Justice Sotomayor also
wrote a concurring opinion, but she joined with Justice Scalia’s opinion as well.).
123
Id. at 958-963.
124
Id.
125
See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, GPS Monitoring Device Leads the Supreme
Court to a Crossroads in Privacy Law, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 45 (2012).
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and how it is applied. GPS monitoring already has been subjected to
Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process challenges.126
The Fourth Amendment implications of GPS monitoring are
addressed in U.S. v. Jones.127 In Jones, the U. S. Supreme Court held
that placing a GPS device on the undercarriage of a car was a search
for which a valid warrant was required.128 However, the Court has also
found no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as cars travel on
public streets.129 Thus, Jones provides a reasonable justification for
law enforcement to attach a GPS monitoring based on tracking a
device onto an automobile as it travels public thoroughfares.130
However, a car parked in a private garage does involve reasonable
expectations of privacy.131 Therefore, GPS technology that tracks a
vehicle into non-public spheres may implicate the Fourth Amendment.
So may GPS capacity on devices such as a smartphone or iPad, when
those are taken into non-public areas. The U.S. Supreme Court has
already found that the use of technology that invades a private home
requires a warrant.132
Whether a valid reasonable expectation of privacy argument exists
for the intimate terrorist will likely turn on whether the monitoring
occurs pre-trial or post-conviction. In post-conviction situations, the
GPS monitoring tracks whether the intimate terrorist is entering an
area from which he already has been excluded by court order. In that
setting, at least, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and thus
no Fourth Amendment trigger.133 Even in those circumstances,
however, GPS technology may capture movement data beyond the
exclusion zones, thus raising expectation-of-privacy concerns. These
circumstances may be alleviated by a monitoring technology called
reverse tagging, which is only triggered when the intimate terrorist
enters the exclusion zone.134
126

See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945; Sveum, 787 N.W.2d at 317. See also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV, V, XIV.
127
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
128
See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
129
See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (involved
placing a radio transmitter in a container in a vehicle).
130
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.Id.
131
See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
132
See, e.g., id. at 40.
133
The trespass-based theory reinvigorated by Jones may, however, create new
ways to argue Fourth Amendment violations. Santry, supra note 10; see also Jones,
132 S. Ct at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
134
Santry, supra note 10, at 1121-22.
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Several states authorize GPS monitoring of an intimate terrorist
who has not yet gone to trial.135 Here, obviously, the intimate terrorist
is still the accused, not the convicted. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that probationers have a lesser liberty interest, that
rationale would not hold in a pre-trial circumstance.136 Thus, pre-trial
monitoring has a greater risk of impinging on constitutional freedoms.
However, if monitoring is imposed as a condition of pre-trial release,
in lieu of incarceration, monitoring is less of an infringement on liberty
than is confinement.
Due Process Clause challenges to monitoring have been sustained,
at least in pre-trial circumstances, when imposed by statutes requiring
electronic monitoring for all offenders.137 However, DV/GPS statutes
generally have an individualized component that may forestall
successful Due Process challenges. In some states, for instance, the
monitoring is ordered only after a dangerousness or lethality
assessment.138 Elsewhere, it is done after a finding of the risk the
offender poses to the victim.139
Equal Protection Clause issues arise if an intimate terrorist is
rendered ineligible for monitoring because of penury.140 Most GPS
statutes require that the offender pay the costs of the monitoring.141 To
avert this concern, some states explicitly authorize community service
or a sliding scale fee.142 Others permit third parties or organizations to
cover the cost.143 Another approach is used in Illinois. It has instituted
fines for domestic violence offenders; such fines are placed in the
Domestic Violence Surveillance Fund, which may be used for low
income offenders.144 Measures like these help avoid successful Equal
Protection Clause challenges.
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See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
137
United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F.Supp.2d 381, 390-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(finding unconstitutional, as applied, provisions of the Adam Walsh Act that require
electronic monitoring in any case involving a minor victim).
138
Hinson, supra note 115, at 286.
139
E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 403.761(7)(a) (West 2011).
140
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1987) (“a state can no more discriminate
on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”).
141
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West 2007).
142
See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 335.1 A(2)(C) (2011)
(community service); See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6 b(6) (West 2011).
143
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (j) (West 2011).
144
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-9-1.6 (a) (West 2011); see also Bryan
Thompson, Changes in the Cindy Bischof Law, 24 D.C.B.A. BRIEF 40 (2011).
136

2012

Intimate Terrorism and Technology

33

2. Effectiveness and Technological Capacity
The efficacy of GPS monitoring is unclear. Some studies suggest
that the monitoring yields a modest decline in recidivism.145 Others
suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between
those on electronic monitors and a control group.146
Even if GPS monitoring in domestic violence cases is shown to
deter future incidents of domestic violence, it is only as good as the
technology that supports it. There are several types of GPS devices
available, including passive devices that do not transmit location data
with enough frequency to enhance safety.147 Moreover, GPS
technology may depend on the cellular capacity in a region, thus
creating problems for mountainous or rural areas. Problems can also
arise in urban areas, due to dense building structures.148 And nothing is
perfect. Technology, or the devices that support it, can fail. There
already have been lawsuits against GPS manufacturers for damages
arising from a failed device.149 Lawsuits aside, if monitoring appears
to be ineffective, it will not be considered a useful tool to protect
survivors.
If the device fails, the monitoring fails. If the monitoring fails, the
survivor is no better off, and indeed, may be worse off, than she would
145
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See, e.g., Turner v. iSecuretrac Corp., No. 03CA70, 2004 WL 944386, at *7
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004) (“Turner, a probationer in a monitoring program,
entered a prohibited area and seriously injured his wife. He was not wearing a
monitoring anklet at the time because a defective device had not been promptly
replaced by the manufacturer. The state district appellate court denied the plaintiff’s
claim, holding, in part, that the trial record did not support the plaintiff’s argument
that the GPS device was defective when it left the manufacturer because it could
have been damaged in shipment, storage, or while being used by a previous offender.
Furthermore, even if the probationer had been wearing the passive GPS device at the
time of the attack, the information about his movements would not have been known
until after the device was plugged into his home monitoring unit. Therefore, the court
reasoned, the manufacturer could not have taken action to prevent the attack, so no
legal cause was established.”); Gable, supra note 94, at 354-55; see also John E.
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be without the monitoring option.150 The recognition of this
undesirable possibility is seen in the several statutes that specifically
require a judge, before imposing monitoring on an offender, to apprise
the victim of the limitations of the technology and the risks involved if
the technology fails.151
3. Implementation
Assume that GPS monitoring is constitutional and that it has been
demonstrated to protect victims. Further assume that GPS monitoring
has a highly effective technological capacity. None of this matters if it
is not being used. Several impediments may prevent monitoring from
being ordered. First, it is being introduced at a time when state
budgets, including budgets for courts, corrections, and probation
departments, are being cut.152 Therefore, as an unfunded mandate, it
may not be instituted. Second, if defendants cannot afford to pay for it,
it may not be used. Finally, some professionals in the field, including
victims’ advocates and prosecutors, may be loath to recommend it if
they believe that it provides women with a false sense of security.153
B. Evidentiary Issues
Technological advances lead to new evidentiary problems.154
Many of these problems may be resolved through proper application of
an appropriate evidentiary rule. For example, GPS monitoring will
yield reports that demonstrate the movements of the offender,
including impermissible activity in the exclusion zone. These reports
may be admissible pursuant to more than one evidentiary rule.155
Courts have a long-established history of responding to and allowing
150
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that, in some circumstances at least, more intimate terrorists will be confined if
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the admissibility of new technologies, whether DNA evidence or
audio-frequency monitoring from an earlier time.156 But judicial
acceptance of GPS reports or other technologically related evidence
will not happen overnight. Thus, there will be a period of time during
which the evidence will be rejected. Further, there may be
circumstances in which the evidence ought not to be admitted, due to
authentication or other valid reliability flaws.157
C. Unintended Consequences
The National Institute of Justice has recently issued a study on the
effectiveness of GPS monitoring.158 It demonstrates a beneficial
reduction of recidivism, at least in some jurisdictions.159 Not all of the
study’s findings, however, are similarly sanguine. One finding, in fact,
is quite disturbing. The study indicates that GPS monitoring is being
ordered for women who have had protection orders issued against
them in situations involving a non-intimate family member, such as a
daughter.160
Although perhaps counterintuitive, this outcome is possible
because protection orders between two people who are not in an
intimate relationship are possible. The class of protected persons in
protection order statutes has been, in general, expanding.161 Moreover,
family members are nearly always included, so that a parent can seek a
protection order from a child, a child from a parent, or siblings from
each other. So although it may be legal to attach a GPS device to a
woman offender who has violated an order against a daughter, a sister,
or a mother, that scenario is not the driving force behind GPS
monitoring legislation. In several states, GPS monitoring statutes were
introduced after particularly heinous or high-publicity intimate
terrorist killings.162 Thus, while the imposition of monitoring in these
156
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non-intimate situations may be within the statutory purview, it foretells
a larger problem.
This is not the first time that unintended consequences that harm
victims have arisen from efforts to combat intimate terrorism. During
the 1990s, for instance, mandatory arrest of batterers was heralded as
an important part of the solution; states rushed to enact these laws.163
As a result of these laws, there was an increase in dual arrests, i.e.,
both the victim and the batterer were arrested simultaneously.164 Dual
arrests occurred when police, upon arriving at the scene, believed that
they could not sort out the facts to accurately determine the identity of
the batterer.165 Consequently, the police arrested both the alleged
victim and alleged batterer. This often happened in circumstances
where both parties were wounded, but the batterer’s wounds were
caused defensively by the victim in an effort to protect herself.
Although the increase in dual arrest eventually led to protocols that
assist the police in determining the primary aggressor, it also revealed
a negative side to laws that were perceived as an important advance
forward.166 Arrest of the victim leads potentially to dual protection
orders; this provided a new tool of coercion for intimate terrorists—
one that comes accompanied by state power. In part because of these
negative consequences, mandatory arrest laws are now one of the few
topics that are subject to criticism by all sides.167
Similarly, mandatory prosecution laws, once viewed as
demonstrating that domestic violence crimes will be treated as
seriously as other types of crimes, are now criticized for, at best,
ignoring survivors’ wishes. And at their worst, these laws now result
in the legal system itself coercively controlling the survivor by forcing
her to bend to the will of the prosecutor. The intimate terrorist’s tactics
of threats and manipulation are now transformed into a prosecutorial
tool. For instance, prosecutors may subpoena survivors and, if they fail
to appear or testify, the prosecutor may levy criminal charges against
the survivors.168
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Unintended consequences have extended beyond the arrest and
prosecution of batterers. For example, judges, convinced that children
may suffer harm when witnessing domestic violence, have started to
consider the presence of domestic violence in the home when making
custody determinations. This advance came after years of studying the
effects of domestic violence on children and advocating those impacts
to courts and legislatures.
Intended to protect children and mothers in the legal context of a
custody battle, these gains instead have been used against adult and
child survivors of intimate terrorism. Battered women have started to
lose their children to foster care because the children were present in
the home when the women were beaten. Thus, the rationale goes, the
women had permitted their children to be exposed to domestic
violence with all its pernicious effects by “allowing” the children to be
at home during their mother’s abuse.169 The knowledge of this
possibility may deter survivors from calling the police, based on the
all-too-real fear of losing their children to foster care.170
In other child custody circumstances, battered women are losing
custody of their children due to “friendly parent” provisions now
engrafted onto custody statutes.171 These well-intended provisions are
meant to protect children from being the victims of inter-parent
squabbling. Judges are to award custody to the parent who is both
more likely to encourage the child’s contact with the other parent and
less likely to disparage the other parent. An intimate terrorist can
easily portray his victim as the “unfriendly” parent who discourages or
avoids contact, thus increasing the terrorist’s odds of getting custody
or, perhaps, simply permitting the terrorist to use the legal system as
yet another tool in aid of coercive control.
None of the above issues lend themselves to easy, clear, per se
resolutions. They do illustrate, however, that advancements intended
to combat intimate terrorism have a history of being used to the
detriment of the victims. Initial indications suggest that DV/GPS
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statutes may be the next area of progress that will be construed against
victims.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has always been hard, and potentially lethal, for the Frans of this
world to escape the Bobbys. Some do—these are the survivors. Others
don’t—these are the victims. Technology is, as often as not, an aid to
the intimate terrorist. The uber-speed of technological advances can
overwhelm a deliberative legal system’s efforts to thwart technology’s
negative effects. Although the pace may be ill-matched, efforts must
continue to prevent the intimate terrorist from enlarging his power
through technology. Once these efforts yield results, further effort is
needed to see that intimate terrorism survivors are not harmed by
measures intended to aid them.

